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Abstract
This paper develops a simple accounting framework that measures the eect of resource
misallocation on aggregate productivity. This framework is based on a multi-sector general
equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes on sectoral factor inputs.
Our framework is exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions.
Moreover, this framework is consistent with that commonly used in productivity analysis. I
apply this framework to measure the extent to which resource misallocation explains the dier-
ence in aggregate productivity across developed countries. I nd that resource misallocation
explains, on average, 17% of the di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1 Introduction
There are large disparities in incomes even across developed countries. Prescott (2002) reports
that there is approximately a 30% to 40% dierence in per capita income among highly developed
countries. He argues that the most important factor in this disparity is the dierence in the level
of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).1 From this standpoint, many theoretical models have
been proposed that try to explain the dierence in aggregate TFP. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
point out that many of these models can be characterized as following the theory of resource
misallocation. This theory states that frictions due to various reasons prevent the ecient use
of resources, resulting in a low aggregate TFP. Then, to what extent does resource misallocation
actually aect aggregate TFP and explain the dierence in aggregate TFP across countries?
To answer these problems, this paper proposes a simple accounting framework that measures
the eect of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP from data. This framework is based on a
multi-sector general equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes on sectoral
factor inputs (capital and labor). As in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008), the sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes for each rm or sector reect the
various kinds of frictions the rm or sector faces. As in Chari et al. (2002), I measure these sector-
specic frictions using the model from data (which are measured from the dierence in factor input
returns between sectors) and assess the eect of these frictions on aggregate TFP. A characteristic
of their tax (or wedge) approach is that this approach can deal with the various types of frictions
that distort resource allocation all together.
Compared with the other papers (cited below) that measure the eect of resource misalloca-
tion on aggregate TFP, there are two distinct characteristics in this paper's framework. First, our
framework is exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions. In par-
ticular, when we measure the contribution of resource misallocation to the dierence in measured
aggregate TFP, we do not need to assume a specic form of preferences or aggregate production
functions.2 Second, this paper's framework is consistent with that commonly used in productivity
analysis.
1Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that the most important factor in the income disparities between developed
and developing countries is also the dierence in aggregate TFP.
2When conducting a counterfactual exercise, our framework implicitly or explicitly needs assumptions on pref-
erences or aggregate production functions to know how sectoral shares change.
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I apply this framework to the sectoral data of countries that are included in the EU KLEMS
database (Timmer, O'Mahony and van Ark, 2008).3 I nd that, on average, 17% of the dierence
in the measured aggregate TFP between the U.S. and other countries is due to sector-level resource
misallocation. The correlation between aggregate TFP and the misallocation eect is high (0.55).
The transport and nancial sectors are the primary sources of capital misallocation, while the
agricultural and nancial sectors are primary sources of labor misallocation. I also nd that the
dierences in sectoral shares between countries, which may be due to structural transformations,
magnify the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the dierence in measured aggregate
TFP.
Several papers measure resource misallocation from cross-sectional dierences in factor input
returns and calculate the resource misallocation eect on aggregate TFP using the general equilib-
rium framework. This paper ts into this literature. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest work
in this eld is de Melo (1977). A computable multi-sector general equilibrium model is applied
to the Colombian economy by de Melo (1977) to calculate the eect of the removal of distortions
on sector-level resource allocation. Recently, Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008) and Vollrath (2009)
used a two-sector model to measure the magnitude of barriers to resource allocation between the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Using a standard model of monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous rms and manufacturing plant-level data from China, India, and the U.S., Hsieh
and Klenow (2007) estimated how resource misallocation aects aggregate TFP. As mentioned
above, compared with these papers, our framework is exible for the assumption on preferences
or aggregate production functions.4 Moreover, our framework is compatible with the framework
commonly used in productivity analysis. Finally, using this paper's framework (to be precise, the
framework of the previous version of this paper, Aoki, 2006), Miyagawa, Fukao, Hamagata and
Takizawa (2008) used the Japanese Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database to measure the eect
of sector-level resource misallocation on aggregate TFP.
Literature on productivity analysis has measured the eect of change in sectoral reallocation
on aggregate TFP growth (see Syrquin, 1984, and Basu and Fernald, 2002, among others). I
show that this paper's decomposition is a generalization of previous studies; while previous studies
3The countries are Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.
4On the other hand, for example, Restuccia et al. (2008) assume the Stone-Geary utility function and Vollrath
(2009) assumes a small open economy, which is equivalent to assuming that goods are a perfect substitute.
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measured the eect of resource misallocation on the aggregate TFP growth rate over time, this
paper's framework can also measure the eect on the level of aggregate TFP and on the dierence in
aggregate TFP across countries. This paper also provides the micro-foundations for the reallocation
eect. Owing to this, the approach used herein can further decompose the causes of resource
misallocation.
Several studies provide examples of resource misallocation. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap
(2008) argue that during the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s, the forbearance lending of banks
shifted resources from healthy rms to zombie rms and zombie-dominated sectors. Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) argue that the dierences in the degree of borrowing constraint between rms can
shift resources from high-productivity rms to low-productivity rms. Hayashi and Prescott (2008)
argue that, for institutional reasons, there was a barrier to labor mobility between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors in prewar Japan. In my model, frictions in the form of taxes capture
the eect of these distortions on resource allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 sets up and analyzes
a static multi-sector general equilibrium model with frictions in the form of sector-specic taxes
on factor inputs. Using the model, Section 3 develops methods to measure the eects of resource
misallocation on aggregate TFP. Using the developed framework, Section 4 measures the eect of
sector-level resource misallocation on aggregate TFP from data. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, I develop a multi-sector competitive equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions.
In keeping with Chari et al. (2002), sector-specic frictions are modeled in the form of taxes on
sectoral factor inputs, the rms are price-takers and pay linear taxes on capital and labor, and
each rm's problem is static. I argue in Appendix A that several types of frictions in each sector
are isomorphic to the taxes on the sector's factor inputs.5
5The term \isomorphic" implies having the same allocation.
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2.1 I Industrial sectors
There are I industrial sectors in the economy. Firms in each sector produce goods (homogeneous
within a sector but heterogeneous among sectors) by using two factor inputs: capital K and labor
L (hereafter, J denotes the factor input in general). Firms are price-takers in both the goods and
factor markets and pay linear taxes on capital and labor inputs, which vary by sectors. Thus,
rms in sector i produce goods given the goods price of the sector pi and capital and labor costs
(1 + Ki)pK and (1 + Li)pL, respectively, where Ki and Li are the capital and labor taxes of
the sector, respectively, and pK and pL are the common factor prices of capital and labor across
sectors, respectively. As each sector produces dierent goods, the goods price pi can vary across
sectors in equilibrium (even if there are no taxes). On the other hand, because capital and labor
are homogeneous across sectors, if Ki = 0 and Li = 0, the factor costs incurred by rms equalize.
As I assume a rm's production function to be constant-returns-to-scale (CRS), I will identify a
sector using a rm below.
The rms possess the Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting CRS. Therefore, a rm
i's production function can be written as follows:
Vi = Fi(Ki; Li)  AiKii L1 ii ; (1)
where Vi is the output, Ki is the capital input, Li is the labor input, and Ai is the productivity of
the rm. I assume that the capital intensity i can vary by sector.
In this setting, the rm's problem is written as
max
Ki;Li
piFi(Ki; Li)  (1 + Ki)pKKi   (1 + Li)pLLi:
5
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:6
ipiVi
Ki
= (1 + Ki)pK ; (2)
(1  i)piVi
Li
= (1 + Li)pL: (3)
If a rm's prot is negative for any positive Ki and Li, the rm chooses not to produce, and the
above FOCs do not hold. Although hereafter, I assume that the above FOCs hold for all sectors,
the results used in the later sections, i.e., (9){(12), hold even when some sectors do not produce.
2.2 Aggregator function
I assume the CRS aggregator function:
V = V (V1; : : : ; VI): (4)
I also assume that the following condition is satised:
@V
@Vi
= pi: (5)
This condition is satised if V is an aggregate good and rms that produce V from Vi are compet-
itive or if V is the household's utility and the household chooses Vi to maximize V . Under these
conditions, the following equation holds7:
V =
X
i
piVi: (6)
6 Note that from (1) and the FOCs, we also attain the following unit cost function:
pi =
1

i
i (1  i)1 i
f(1 + Ki)pKgif(1 + Li)pLg1 i
Ai
:
7I normalize the aggregate good price to unity.
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2.3 Resource constraints
Finally, I assume that the aggregate capital and labor supply are exogenous. Thus, the following
resource constraints apply:
X
i
Ki = K; (7)X
i
Li = L; (8)
where K and L are the aggregate capital and labor supply, respectively.
2.4 Equilibrium relations
A competitive equilibrium of this economy is dened in the following manner.
Denition. Given the productivities and taxes of I goods sectors fAi; 1 + Ki; 1 + Lig, and
the aggregate capital K and labor L, respectively, a competitive equilibrium is a set of the output,
capital, labor, and prices of I goods sectors fVi;Ki; Li; pig, the aggregate value V , and the common
factor prices pK and pL that satisfy the following conditions:
1. FOCs of rms in I goods sectors (2) and (3), where Vi is given by (1),
2. CRS assumption and marginal conditions (4) and (5),
3. resource constraints (7) and (8).
In what follows, I derive the expressions for Ki and Li using the equilibrium conditions. Using
(2) and (7), Ki can be rewritten as follows:
Ki =
(1+Ki)pKKi
(1+Ki)pKP
j
(1+Kj)pKKj
(1+Kj)pK
K
=
piYii
1
(1+Ki)pKP
j pjYjj
1
(1+Kj)pK
K
=
~ii 11+KiP
j ~jj
1
1+Kj
K;
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where ~i is the sectoral share piVi=V .8 This equation is rearranged as follows:
Ki =
~ii
~
~KiK; (9)
where ~ is the weighted average of capital intensities
P
i ~ii and ~Ki is the term composed of
frictions.9 ~Ki is dened as
~Ki  KiP
j

~jj
~

Kj
; and Ki  11 + Ki : (10)
In the same way, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of Li:
Li =
~i(1  i)
1  ~
~LiL; (11)
where
~Li  LiP
j

~j(1 j)
1 ~

Lj
; and Li  11 + Li : (12)
Equations (9){(12) uncover several eects of taxes on the resource allocation of capital and
labor. First, from (9) and (11), we nd that taxes mainly aect the allocation of resources through
~Ji, although taxes can also aect ~i. Second, from (10) and (12), we nd that ~Ji is the ratio
of the reciprocal of sector i's return on the factor input and the mean of the reciprocals of the
returns across sectors. Owing to this property, the absolute magnitude of taxes does not aect the
resource allocation among sectors. For instance, if the tax on capital is identical across sectors,
then ~Ki becomes unity, which is equal to the value when there were no frictions. On the other
hand, the distribution of taxes across sectors aects resource allocation. For example, if Ki is
smaller than the weighted average of Kj (i.e., sector i's capital is taxed more) and if ~i do not
vary much, ~Ki becomes less than unity; in this case, the capital allocated to sector i is less than
that allocated when there were no frictions.
In the empirical section, I do not measure frictions Ji themselves, but measure ~Ji, which
8I add a tilde (~) to denote the variables that depend on the functional form of V .
9Hsieh and Klenow (2007) also derive a similar expression.
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capture the distribution of these frictions. ~Ji are measured using the rewritten forms of equations
(9) and (11):
~Ki =

~ii
~
 1
Ki
K
; and ~Li =

~i(1  i)
1  ~
 1
Li
L
: (13)
3 Analyzing the Eects of Resource Misallocation on Ag-
gregate TFP
In this section, in order to calculate the eects of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP, I
decompose aggregate TFP into sectoral TFPs, sectoral shares, and resource misallocation by taking
an approximation of aggregator function V . I provide an interpretation of the decomposition. This
section also describes a method to identify which sector contributes to resource misallocation. Since
the component of resource misallocation consists of a combination of sectoral frictions and sectoral
shares, I also describe a method to identify the contribution of these factors.
3.1 Decomposition of aggregate TFP
In order to analyze the eect of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP, I compare the aggregator
function at state S, V S , with that at state T , V T , and apply the mean value theorem (hereafter,
the variables with the superscript S denote those at state S, such as V S). State S, for example,
corresponds to Japan, while state T corresponds to the U.S. I assume that the capital intensity of
each sector i is the same across dierent states.
By applying the mean value theorem and using (5) and (6), we obtain
ln

V S
V T

=
X
i
@ lnV
@ lnVi
ln

V Si
V Ti

'
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

;
where i  (~Si + ~Ti )=2.10 The RHS is the Tornqvist index of the value added dierence. By
10In order to derive the rst equality, I dene (x) as follows:
(x)  lnV (expfx lnV S1 + (1  x) lnV T1 g; : : : ; expfx lnV SI + (1  x) lnV TI g); 0  x  1;
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substituting (1), (9), and (11) into the above equation, we obtain the following decomposition:
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

=
X
i
i ln

ASi
ATi

+
X
i
i ln
 
~Si
~Ti
,
(~S)i(1  ~S)1 i
(~T )i(1  ~T )1 i
!
+
X
i
i
(
i ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+ (1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!)
+ ln

KS
KT

+ (1  ) ln

LS
LT

; (14)
where  Pi ii.
I dene the aggregate TFP of state S relative to state T and refer to it as ATFP as follows:
ATFP 
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

   ln

KS
KT

  (1  ) ln

LS
LT

: (15)
This is the standard denition of aggregate TFP.11 By rewriting (14) using the denition of ag-
gregate TFP, I obtain
ATFP =
X
i
i ln

ASi
ATi

+
X
i
i ln
 
~Si
~Ti
,
(~S)i(1  ~S)1 i
(~T )i(1  ~T )1 i
!
+
X
i
i
(
i ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+ (1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!)
: (16)
I refer to the rst term of the RHS in (16) as the sectoral TFP term (STFP). STFP is the
weighted average of sectoral TFPs and is the same as the Domar (1961) weighted aggregate TFP. I
refer to the second term as the sectoral share term (SS); this term mainly consists of sectoral shares.
Theoretically, when the dierences in ~i between states S and T are small, SS is approximately
zero (for the proof, see Appendix B). In addition, as reported in Section 4, SS is small in our data.
I refer to the third term in (16) as the allocational eciency term (AE), which represents resource
misallocation because it consists of ~i that, as can be seen from (9) and (11), distort resource
and apply the mean value theorem in the following manner:
(1)  (0) = 0()(1  0);
where 0    1.
11See Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) and Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982).
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allocation. When the friction level is identical across the sectors for each state (i.e., Si = 
S
j and
Ti = 
T
j ), AE = 0.
3.2 Interpretation of the decomposition
The decomposition in (16) can be used to calculate the measured dierence in aggregate TFP
between the two actual states due to the dierences in sectoral TFPs measured by STFP and
due to the dierence in the distribution of sectoral frictions measured by AE. When used in this
manner, this paper's decomposition can be considered as an extension of that by Syrquin (1984)
and Basu and Fernald (2002): we can show that when S and T correspond to periods t and
t  1, respectively, AE is equal to their reallocation term.12 Compared with theirs, our framework
enables further decompositions of AE in several dierent ways. For example, AE in (16) can be
decomposed into a state S frictions component that consists of ~SKi and ~
S
Li and a state T frictions
component that consists of ~TKi and ~
T
Li. In a later section, I explain how to decompose AE into
sectoral contributions.
The decomposition in (16) can also be used to measure how aggregate TFP would change
when frictions counterfactually disappear under certain conditions. Applying the framework of
this paper, Miyagawa et al. (2008) calculate this eect under the following conditions: state S
corresponds to an actual state, state T corresponds to a no-frictions state (i.e., ~TJi = 1), and
sectoral TFPs and sectoral shares of state T are the same as those of state S.
We can also reinterpret the measured AE or SS + AE between two actual states from this
viewpoint: the negative of the AE (or SS + AE) between the two actual states measures how the
dierence in aggregate TFP between the two states would change when frictions counterfactually
disappear in both cases. This is under the condition that the dierences in sectoral shares ~i
between states S and T are due to factors other than the dierences in sectoral frictions between
the states (or due to the dierences in sectoral frictions).
To show this, rst, let us consider the case where the dierences in sectoral shares ~i between
states S and T are due to factors other than the dierences in sectoral frictions i between the
states. In this case, when frictions disappear for both states, AE becomes zero while STFP and
SS remain unchanged because sectoral frictions do not aect ~i (and sectoral TFPs). Then, ATFP
12Note that since the dierences in ~i between t and t  1 are small, SS is approximately zero (see Appendix B).
11
without friction is equal to STFP + SS, while ATFP with frictions is equal to STFP + SS + AE.
The misallocation eect is equal to the dierence between these two ATFPs, i.e.,  AE.
Next, let us consider another case in which the dierences in sectoral shares ~i between states
S and T are due to the dierences in sectoral frictions i between the states. In this case, when
the frictions at state S change to those at state T , ~i, ~, and ~i are the same for states. Then,
the change in aggregate TFP by the change in frictions is equal to  (SS+AE). It is also equal to
the change in aggregate TFP when the frictions in both cases are eliminated.
Since, as noted above, SS is small in our data, I will henceforth focus on AE.
3.3 Contribution of each sector to AE
An advantage of our framework is that it can identify which sector's frictions cause the dierence
in aggregate TFP. This section provides the method.13 In order to identify the contribution of
the frictions of a particular sector (referred to as sector i), I calculate a ctitious AE under the
following assumptions (while I drop out superscripts S and T for convenience, note that these
assumptions are applied to both states). For both states, I x the factor inputs of sector i to the
actual observed values and eciently reallocate the remaining factor inputs across the remaining
sectors of the economy. Then, the only source of distortion would be in sector i. For simplicity, I
also assume that sectoral shares ~i are xed. I refer to the AE calculated under this assumption
as AEi.
AEi is measured as follows (here, I decompose AEi into capital and labor components). First,
under the above assumption, from (9) and (11), sector i's ~Ji is the same as the actual ~Ji.
Second, under the above assumption, since factor prices are the same across the remaining sectors,
~Jm = ~Jn = ~J i for the remaining sectors (m and n are the sectors other than sector i, and are
summarized by  i). By rearranging
K i  K  Ki =
X
m6=i
Km =
X
m6=i
~mm
~
~K iK (17)
13In (16), I do not simply decompose AE into sectoral components. The reason for this is as follows. From (9)
and (11), we nd that the (absolute) distance of ~Ji from unity represents the magnitude of distortion. However, a
simple decomposition of AE in (16) by sectors does not capture this characteristic. Suppose that ~SKi >
~TKi = 1.
Then, although the state S's allocation of capital in sector i is distorted while state T 's is not, a simple sectoral
decomposition of capital AE, ii ln(~
S
Ki=
~TKi), becomes positive (this implies that the sector's friction has a positive
eect on ATFP; this is a contradiction).
12
(note that K, Ki, and consequently K i are the same as the actual ones while Km(m 6= i) is not),
we obtain
~K i =

~ i i
~
 1
K i
K
; (18)
where ~ i  1   ~i and  i 
P
m6=i(~m=(1   ~i))m (i.e.,  i is a weighted average of am
(m 6= i)). Then, the capital component of AEi, denoted by capital AEi, is calculated as follows:
capital AEi = ii ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+  i i ln
 
~SK i
~TK i
!
; (19)
where  i  1   i and  i 
P
m6=i(m=(1   i))m (i.e.,  i is a weighted average of am
(m 6= i)). In the same manner, labor AEi is calculated by
labor AEi = i(1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!
+  i(1   i) ln
 
~SL i
~TL i
!
; (20)
where ~L i is measured by
~L i =

~ i(1   i)
1  ~
 1
L i
L
; (21)
where L i  L  Li.
As is obvious from (19) and (20), AEi is equal to AE when there are only two sectors: sectors
i and  i. In Appendix C, I show that the sum of AEi calculated above is approximately equal to
the actual AE.14
3.4 Contribution of sectoral frictions and sectoral shares to AE
AE depends on not only the dierences in sectoral frictions Ji across states but also those in
sectoral shares ~i, because ~Ji depends on both factors. This section illustrates why the distinction
between the two factors is important and provides a method for identifying the eect due to each
factor.
To understand the importance of the dierences in ~i across states for AE, suppose a two-
14They are also close in our data.
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sector model (an agricultural sector A and a non-agricultural sector N). Additionally, I assume
that i = 0 for these sectors. Further, suppose that the Li are the same for states S and T but
~i are not. Then, AE is calculated as
AE = A ln
 
~SLA
~TLA
!
+ N ln
 
~SLN
~TLN
!
= ln
 
~TALA + ~
T
NLN
  ln  ~SALA + ~SNLN :
Now further assume that ~SA > ~
T
A and LA > LN . The former assumption is reasonable when T
is a more mature economy than S. The latter is also reasonable because, in data, LA is higher
than the average of all sectors.15 AE then becomes negative, irrespective of the same Li. In this
case, the dierences in ~i generate the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on aggregate
TFP.
In order to identify how much is due to sectoral shares, I calculate a counterfactual AE using
~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg) instead of ~SJi, where ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg) is calculated from the sectoral shares of state
S ~Sj and the sectoral frictions of state T 
T
Jj as follows (i and the state T remain unchanged):
~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) 
TKiP
j

~Sj j
~S

TKj
; ~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) 
TLiP
j

~Sj (1 j)
1 ~S

TLj
:
I refer to the AE calculated using these frictions as the counterfactual AE. If the magnitude of
AE is large owing to the dierences in ~i across countries, the counterfactual AE will be close to
the AE calculated using ~SJi. If the results are due to the dierences in ~Ji across countries, the
counterfactual AE will be small in magnitude.
In the empirical section, ~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) is measured from
~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) =
~TKiP
j

~Sj j
~S

~TKj
; (22)
because the denominator of the ~TKj (i.e.,
P
m(~
T
mm=~
T )TKm) is canceled out and 
T
Kj appear on
the RHS of the numerator and denominator of (22). In the same way, ~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) is measured
15We can conrm this in Figure 2.
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from
~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) =
~TLiP
j

~Sj (1 j)
1 ~S

~TLj
: (23)
4 Empirical Results
In this section, using the framework developed in the previous sections and the sectoral data of
countries that are included in the EU KLEMS database, I calculate the contribution of sector-
level resource misallocation to cross-country dierences in aggregate TFP. After measuring the
distribution of sector-level frictions from the data, I calculate sectoral share (SS), allocational
eciency (AE), and aggregate TFP (ATFP) between the U.S. and other countries (in the model,
state T corresponds to the U.S. and state S, to other countries). I also identify the sector that causes
the resource misallocation and whether or not misallocation is due to the dierences in sectoral
shares across countries. Since I impose an assumption that i is the same across countries, I also
check its robustness.
4.1 Measurement procedure
We can measure AE by measuring ~Ji, ~J i, ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg), i, and ~i.
~Ji can be measured from (13) because Ki, K, Li, and L are available from the data, and ~i
and i can be measured as discussed below. Measuring ~Ji in this way would capture several kinds
of distortions that aect cross-sectional, sector-level resource allocation such as those in Appendix
A. In the same manner, ~J i and ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg) are measured from (18), (21), (22), and (23).
For the reasons explained below, I use i measured from the U.S. data, under the assumption
that the biases on measured i are small in the U.S. and that the i of a given sector is the same
across developed countries. For the robustness check, in Section 4.6, I also measure AE where i
is measured from each country's data.
The reason I do not use i in each country is because the measured i can be biased if there
are market imperfections. Since the taxes in our model do not correspond to those in the tax data,
we cannot measure an unbiased i by simply using FOCs in (2) and (3). Thus, we have to deal
with the same diculties in measuring capital intensity, as discussed in previous studies. First, it
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is known that if there are imperfections in the goods market, i measured from revenue share can
have biases (for details, see Basu and Fernald, 2002). On the other hand, if there are imperfections
in the factor markets, the i measured from the factor input costs can have biases (for details, see
Appendix A.4).
The ~i can be measured from the sectoral nominal shares, which is consistent with the model's
assumption.
4.2 Data
I mainly use the annual sectoral data of the EU KLEMS database (Timmer et al., 2008), except
for the data on purchasing power parity (PPP) rate for value added which are taken from the
Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) Productivity Level database (Inklaar and
Timmer, 2008, hereafter the GGDC database), and that on PPP rate for capital which are taken
from OECD (2002).16 The countries studied are Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. for 1985,
1995, and 2005.17 The sectors considered in this study include (1) \Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
and Fishing" (hereafter, the agricultural sector), (2) \Mining and Quarrying" (the mining sector),
(3) \Total Manufacturing" (the manufacturing sector), (4) \Electricity, Gas and Water Supply"
(the electricity sector), (5) \Construction" (the construction sector), (6) \Wholesale and Retail
Trade" (the wholesale sector), (7) \Hotels and Restaurants" (the hospitality sector), (8) \Transport
and Storage and Communication" (the transport sector), and (9) \Financial Intermediation" (the
nancial sector).18
We need data on sectoral capital inputs Ki, sectoral labor inputs Li, sectoral capital intensities
i, and sectoral shares ~i, in order to measure SS and AE. For Ki, I use \real xed capital stock,
1995 prices" of \all assets" in the EU KLEMS database. For Li, I use \total hours worked by
persons engaged." The i are measured as the \capital compensation"=(\capital compensation"+
16 Although the GGDC database also provides capital and labor data for cross-country comparisons, I do not use
these data. This is because the capital and labor data in the database are constructed assuming that the rate of
return on an input|which, roughly speaking, corresponds to (1 + Ji)pJ in our model, is the same across sectors.
17They are the countries whose output, capital, and labor data are available in the EU KLEMS database. For
the Czech Republic, Germany, Portugal, and Sweden, I use the data for 1995 and 2005 due to data availability. For
the U.S., I use \United States-NAICS based" data. Moreover, for the measurement of i, I use the U.S. data from
1977 to 2005.
18I choose these sectors on the basis of the major division of the Statistical Classication of Economic Activities
in the European Community (NACE).
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\labor compensation") for the U.S. (average gures for the years 1977 to 2005). The ~i are mea-
sured from the share of nominal value added (\gross value added at current basic prices") of each
country during each period.
In order to measure ATFP, we need the PPP-adjusted sectoral output V PPPi and the sectoral
capital KPPPi .
19 The PPP-adjusted output of sector i at year t, V PPPit , is obtained as the nominal
value added  price-adjustment rate, where the price-adjustment rate is calculated as the ination
rate divided by the PPP rate, (P cVA;i;1997=P
c
VA;i;t)=PPP
c
VA;i;1997 (P
c
VA;i;t is the \gross value added,
price indices" for sector i in country c at year t, and PPPcVA;i;1997 is the PPP rate for value added for
sector i in the country c's currency per U.S. dollar in 1997).20 The PPP-adjusted sectoral capital
KPPPi is calculated in a similar manner, except that we use the same price-adjustment rate across
the sectors to be consistent with the model (in the model, capital is homogeneous). More pre-
cisely, the price-adjustment rate for capital is calculated as (P cK;TOT;1999=P
c
K;TOT;1995)=PPP
c
K;1999
(P cK;TOT;t is the \gross xed factor formation price index" of \all assets" for \Total Industries" in
country c in year t, and PPPcK;1999 is the PPP rate for \capital goods" in country c's currency per
U.S. dollar in 1999).21
For reference, I report the measured ~Ki and ~L in Figures 1 and 2 (the values are the averages
of the years for each country and each sector). The higher the sectoral return on capital or labor
as compared with the other sectors of the same country, the lower the measured ~Ki or ~Li.
[Figure 1]
[Figure 2]
4.3 SS, AE, and the contribution to ATFP
Using (15) and (16), I calculate the sectoral share (SS), allocational eciency (AE), and aggregate
TFP (ATFP) between the U.S. and other countries. Note that in the equations, state T corresponds
to the U.S. while state S corresponds to other countries. Table 1 reports the averages of these
19Note that the choice of the PPP rates only aects ATFP and not SS or AE.
20In the GGDC database, the PPP rates for value added in the manufacturing and transport sectors are not
available, while those for their subsectors are available. I obtain the PPP rates in the manufacturing and transport
sectors by taking the geometric average of the subsectors' PPP rates, where the weights are the averages of the
nominal value added shares in the two countries.
21The PPP rate is taken from Table 2 in OECD (2002).
I do not use the PPP rate for capital in the GGDC database because it is the PPP rate for the cost of capital.
Moreover, there are problems, as noted in footnote 16.
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results over the years. For reference, in Table 2, I also report the decomposition of AE into two
components|the U.S. and other countries as discussed in Section 3.2.22 Further, AE is decomposed
into a capital frictions component that consists of ~SKi and ~
T
Ki and a labor frictions component
that consists of ~SLi and ~
T
Li. To see how AE and ATFP change over the years, Figure 3 plots the
scatter graph of AE and ATFP.
[Table 1]
[Table 2]
[Figure 3]
The rst column in Table 1 reports the sectoral shares (SS). We nd that SS is small and
approaches zero. The second column reports the allocational eciency (AE). For example, the
result on AE for Japan implies that the aggregate TFP of Japan as compared with that of the
U.S. is 8:6% lower because of sector-level resource misallocation. The third column calculates the
dierences in aggregate TFP (ATFP) between the U.S. and other countries.
The importance of resource misallocation for the dierence in aggregate TFP can be measured
by dividing AE by ATFP. The results are shown in the fourth column in Table 1. The results
range from less than 0% for Germany to more than 100% for the Netherlands. The average gure
across countries, when we exclude Germany and the Netherlands, is 17%.23 This implies that,
on average, 17% of the dierences in aggregate TFP between the U.S. and other countries are
explained by resource misallocation. In addition, the correlation between AE and ATFP in the
table is 0.55 (see also the scatter graph in Figure 3). These results suggest that the sector-level
resource misallocation is an important factor of cross-country dierences in aggregate TFP between
these developed countries.
4.4 Contribution of each sector to AE
Using the result in Section 3.3, this section analyzes which sector contributes to AE. Figures 4 and
5 report the capital and labor AEi calculated using equations (18){(21).
22Although we might expect the value of the U.S. component to be stable across countries, unfortunately, it is
not so.
23The average of AE=ATFP, when we set the scale as 0% for Germany and 100% for the Netherlands, is 23%.
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[Figure 4]
[Figure 5]
Figure 4 reports that for these countries, the magnitude of capital AEi is large for the transport
and nancial sectors; this implies that these sectors are the causes of resource misallocation of
capital. This is because the return on capital is low (i.e., ~Ki is high) in the transport sector,
while the return on capital is high (i.e., ~Ki is low) in the nancial sector (see Figure 1).24 On the
other hand, Figure 5 suggests that the agricultural and nancial sectors are the causes of labor
misallocation. As in capital AEi, this is because the return on labor is low (i.e., ~Li is high) in the
agricultural sector, while the return on labor is high (i.e., ~Li is low) in the nancial sector (see
Figure 2).
4.5 Contribution of sectoral frictions and sectoral shares to AE
As argued in Section 3.4, the AE results depend on the dierences in sectoral frictions and the
dierences in sectoral shares across countries. The interpretation of the results in the previous
sections diers depending on the actual cause of the AE. If the former is the cause, the dierences
in sectoral frictions between countries are a cause of the dierences in aggregate TFP between
countries. On the other hand, if the latter is the cause, other mechanisms that aect sectoral shares
generate the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the dierences in aggregate TFP. Here,
in order to identify this problem, I calculate the counterfactual AE discussed in Section 3.4.
The rst column in Table 3 reports the counterfactual AE for each country. The magnitude of
the counterfactual AE is not small. In order to ascertain the magnitude, I calculate the ratio of
the counterfactual AE and the original AE in the second column of Table 3. The ratio varies from
less than 0% for Japan to more than 100% for Australia, the Czech Republic, Germany, and the
U.K. This result implies that all of the measured misallocation for Japan is due to the dierences
in sectoral frictions between Japan and the U.S. On the other hand, most of the misallocation
eect for Australia is due to the dierences in sectoral shares between Australia and the U.S.
[Table 3]
24A more explicit reason is that in addition to the fact that the return on capital is low (high), the capital friction
of the sector Ki is lower (higher) or the sectoral share is higher (lower) in other countries (see Section 3.4).
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4.6 Capital intensity i
I measure i from the U.S. data, under the assumption that the i are the same across developed
countries. For the robustness check, I also calculate the cross-country AE for the case where the
i are measured for each country for each year.25 I report the results in the third column of Table
3. We can conrm that the results are similar to the AE in Table 1.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I proposed a simple multi-sector accounting framework to measure the eect of
resource misallocation on aggregate productivity. The characteristics of this framework are that
it is micro-founded, exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions,
and consistent with the framework commonly used in productivity analysis. Using this framework,
I measured the extent to which resource misallocation explains the dierence in aggregate TFP
across developed countries. I found that sector-level resource misallocation accounted for, on
average, 17% of the dierences in aggregate TFP among developed countries. I also provided
methods to identify the causes of the resource misallocation.
There are some limitations in this paper's analysis. The rst involves the interpretation of
cross-sectional dierences in returns on factor inputs. In this paper, cross-sectional dierences in
returns are interpreted as distortions. However, other interpretations such as the dierences in
eciency wage and the quality of factor inputs (e.g., dierences in educational attainment) across
sectors, and the existence of investment adjustment costs are also possible. For the former two
instances, some of these eects might cancel each other out in a cross-country analysis if the degree
of these eects is similar across countries. The eect in the last case might be inferred from the
change in the eect of measured frictions over a period of time. However, further improvements
are needed to solve these problems. Second, this paper does not take into account material inputs.
If frictions on the allocation of materials exist, there can be eects on aggregate productivity.
25 AE expressed in (16) is modied as follows:
AE =
∑
i
i
{
Si ln
~SKi   Ti ln ~TKi
}
+
∑
i
i
{
(1  Si ) ln ~SLi   (1  Ti ) ln ~TLi
}
:
The years when i =2 [0; 1] is measured are eliminated from the calculation (this is the reason why the result for
Germany is not available).
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Exploration of this issue is also left for future research.
Appendix
A Examples of Sector-level or Firm-level Frictions
In the model in Section 2, the frictions that rms face appear as taxes imposed on their factor
inputs, rms are price-takers, and a rm's problem is static. In the following examples, following
Chari et al. (2002), I argue that the eect of several types of frictions in each sector is isomorphic
to the taxes on this sector's factor inputs|the allocation is the same. In particular, in the last
example, the eect of frictions in a dynamic model is isomorphic to taxes in the static model in
Section 2 in terms of the current period allocation.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, Appendix A.4 explains that i measured from factor input cost
can have biases for the following models.
A.1 Barrier to labor mobility
Hayashi and Prescott (2008) argue that a barrier to labor mobility from the agricultural sector to
the non-agricultural sector was one of the causes of stagnation in prewar Japan. I demonstrate
that the allocation of this model can be achieved in the model in Section 2.
First, let us consider a labor immobility model. Suppose that there are two sectors (the agri-
cultural sector A and the non-agricultural sector N). The rms in each sector are competitive.
However, there is a constraint on labor mobility between the sectors: labor input in sector A, LA,
has to be at least LA (i.e., LA  LA). Notations of the model are basically the same as in Section
2. Then, the typical rm's problem is
max
Ki;Li
piFi(Ki; Li)  pKKi   pLiLi; i 2 fA or Ng: (24)
The factor price on labor, pLi, can be dierent between the sectors, because of the constraint on
labor mobility:
pLA 6= pLN : (25)
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Therefore, the allocation may dier from that in the no-friction case.
Suppose that other settings are the same as in Section 2. Then, if I set (1 + LA)pL = pLA,
(1 + LN )pL = pLN , and (1 + Ki) = 1 in the Section 2 model, the eect of the barrier to labor
mobility is isomorphic to the taxes in the Section 2 model. For the proof, check that equilibrium
conditions for these two models are identical.
A.2 Imperfect competition
I demonstrate that frictions caused by imperfect competition such as monopoly, oligopoly, or
monopolistic competition can also be expressed as taxes on factor inputs.
Let us consider the following rm's problem: the rm is a price-taker in the factor market but
a price-setter in the output market. Notations of the model are basically the same as in Section 2.
Accordingly, the rm's cost minimization problem is
min
Ki;Li
pKKi + pLLi; (26)
s:t: Vi = Fi(Ki; Li): (27)
The FOCs of the problem are
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Ki
=
pi
i
pK ; (28)
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Li
=
pi
i
pL; (29)
where i is the Lagrange multiplier and pi is the price of the good that the rm produces. Since
i is equal to the marginal cost, pi=i is the markup and is equal to unity when the rm is a
price-taker in the output market.
Suppose that the other settings are the same as in Section 2. Then, if I set (1 + Ki) =
(1 + Li) = pi=i in the Section 2 model, the eect of imperfection is isomorphic to the taxes in
the Section 2 model. The proof is the same as that in Section A.1.
A.3 Borrowing constraint
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that the dierences in the degree of borrowing constraint between
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rms can aect resource allocation and aggregate productivity. I demonstrate that the allocation
of this model at a certain period can be achieved in the model in Section 2.
First, let us consider a recursive borrowing constraint model under no uncertainty. Suppose
a typical rm i. The state of the rm is as follows: Ki; 1 is the capital input and Bi; 1 is
the borrowing. The rm chooses labor input, Li, new capital, Ki, and new borrowing Bi. For
simplicity, the prices are constant. Then, the rm's problem is written as follows:
Ji(Ki; 1; Bi; 1) = max
Ki;Li;Bi
i +mJi(Ki; Bi);
s:t: i = piFi(Ki; Li)  pLLi   qK(Ki   (1  )Ki; 1)
+
Bi
R
 Bi; 1;
Bi  iqK(1  )Ki; (30)
where m is the discount factor, R is the gross interest rate, qK is the price of capital (not the rental
price but the asset price),  is the depreciation rate, (30) is the rm's borrowing constraint in the
next period, and i is the rm's collateral constraint parameter. The other notations are the same
as in Section 2. This rm's problem is similar to that of Jermann and Quadrini (2006) except for
the timing of the investment and the formulation of the borrowing constraint. Then, the FOCs
are rearranged as follows:
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Ki
= qK  mqK(1  )  iiqK(1  ); (31)
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Li
= pL;
where i is the Lagrange multiplier of the rm's borrowing constraint and is zero when the con-
straint is not bound.
Suppose that, in the above model, other settings, aggregate capital, and labor of the current
period are the same as in the model in Section 2. Then, if I set (1 + Ki)pK to be equal to the
RHS of (31) and (1 + Li) = 1 in the model in Section 2, the eect of the borrowing constraint
is isomorphic to the taxes in the model in Section 2. For the proof, check that (intratemporal)
equilibrium conditions for these two models are identical.
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A.4 Biases arising in the measurement of i
Here, I argue that if there are imperfections in the factor market as in Appendices A.1 and A.3,
i measured from factor input cost can have biases.
To examine this, take the labor immobility model in Section A.1 as an example. In this model,
because of the barrier to labor mobility, the labor input cost is dierent across sectors, although
the quality of labor input is homogeneous in the model. However, the labor input cost is usually
measured under the assumption that the cost of labor input with the same quality level is the same
between sectors. Thus, measured 1   i can have biases, if the labor input cost measured in this
way is used.26 A similar problem arises on the capital side in the case of the borrowing constraint
model in Section A.3.
B Value of SS when the Dierences in ~i are Small
Here, I show that SS dened in Section 3.1 is approximately zero when the dierences in ~i between
the states S and T are small. When
P
i i = 1, the following relationship holds:
X
i
iln i '
X
i
i
i
i
= 1  1
= 0:
By setting i  ~ii=~ or i  ~i(1  i)=(1  ~), we nd that

X
i
ii

ln

~ii
~

and (1  )
X
i
i(1  i)
1    ln

~i(1  i)
1  ~

are approximately zero ( denotes the dierence between states S and T ). Finally, SS is the sum
of these terms.
26In this case, 1  i measured from the revenue share does not have biases.
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C Relation between AEi and AE
This appendix shows that if ~Si and ~
T
i are small for each sector, the sum of AEi is approximately
equal to AE. The sum of the capital AEi, AEKi, in (19) can be written as follows:
X
i
AEKi = AEK +
X
i
(  ii) ln
 
~SK i
~TK i
!
;
where AEK is the capital component of AE (AEK 
P
i ii ln

~SKi=~
T
Ki

). We show that the
second term of the RHS of the above equation approximately becomes zero. Then, the sum of
AEKi is approximately equal to AEK . In the same manner, we can show that the sum of AELi is
also approximately equal to AELi. Thus, we can show the statement of the appendix.
To demonstrate that the second term of the RHS of the above equation approximately becomes
zero, I further focus on the state S component (the same result applies to the state T component).
Thus, I show
X
i
(  ii) ln ~SK i ' 0; (32)
when ~Si and ~
T
i are small (note that i depends on ~
T
i ). From (18), we obtain the following
relationship:
~SK i = 1 +
1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
By substituting the above in the LHS of (32) and rearranging, we obtain
(32) =
X
i

  ii
~S   ~Si i

~S
~Si i
  1

~Si i ln
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A
=
X
i

  ii
~S   ~Si i

~Si i ln
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A ~
S
~S
i
i
 1
:
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For suciently small ~Si and ~
T
i ,

  ii
~S   ~Si i

' 
~S
; and
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A ~
S
~S
i
i
 1
' exp

1  ~SKi

:
Thus, if ~Si and ~
T
i are small in all the sectors,
(32) ' 
~S
X
i
~Si i

1  ~SKi

= 0:
The last equation becomes zero, because from denition
P
i ~
S
i i = ~
S and
P
i ~
S
i i
~SKi = ~
S .
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SS AE ATFP AE=ATFP
Australia 0:9%  5:0%  28:5% 17%
Austria  0:3%  8:2%  46:0% 18%
Czech Republic  0:8%  4:8%  82:5% 6%
Denmark 0:2%  5:9%  16:5% 36%
Finland  1:0%  9:3%  29:2% 32%
Germany  0:7% 1:8%  15:1%  12%
Italy  0:4%  4:9%  42:2% 12%
Japan  1:6%  8:6%  71:9% 12%
Netherlands 0:5%  5:8%  0:2% 2584%
Portugal 0:0%  16:0%  78:1% 20%
Sweden  0:5%  4:6%  25:1% 18%
U.K. 0:3%  0:7%  24:2% 3%
Average 17%
Correlation 0:55
Table 1: Sectoral share (SS), allocational eciency (AE), aggregate TFP (ATFP), and AE di-
vided by ATFP (AE=ATFP) of the countries compared with the U.S. Notes: AE (or SS + AE)
measures the eect of resource misallocation on the dierence in aggregate TFP (ATFP) between
other countries and the U.S. Moreover, AE=ATFP measures the extent to which the dierences
in aggregate TFP between the countries are explained by resource misallocation. \Average" is
the average of AE=ATFP across the countries when we exclude Germany and the Netherlands.
\Correlation" is the correlation between AE and ATFP. These values are the averages over the
years.
Each country U.S. Capital Labor
Australia  7:8% 2:8%  4:4%  0:6%
Austria  12:1% 4:0%  3:1%  5:1%
Czech Republic  7:8% 3:0%  3:6%  1:2%
Denmark  10:2% 4:3%  3:8%  2:1%
Finland  12:9% 3:5%  5:3%  4:1%
Germany  4:5% 6:2% 0:1% 1:6%
Italy  8:8% 3:9% 0:1%  5:1%
Japan  13:9% 5:3%  4:0%  4:6%
Netherlands  9:9% 4:0%  1:2%  4:6%
Portugal  19:0% 3:1%  2:7%  13:3%
Sweden  9:8% 5:2%  4:3%  0:3%
U.K.  5:3% 4:6%  0:5%  0:2%
Table 2: Two decompositions of AE. Notes: In the rst two columns, the AE in Table 1 is
decomposed into two components: each country and the U.S.; in the last two columns, the AE
is decomposed into capital and labor components. (In both cases, the sum of the components is
equal to the AE in Table 1.) These values are the averages over the years.
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CFAE CFAE=AE AE with di i
Australia  7:1% 142%  5:8%
Austria  3:1% 38%  9:6%
Czech Republic  6:1% 126%  3:9%
Denmark  2:7% 45%  5:9%
Finland  3:6% 39%  5:6%
Germany 1:8% 100% n.a.
Italy  3:2% 65%  5:9%
Japan 0:3%  4%  9:7%
Netherlands  4:2% 73%  4:4%
Portugal  6:4% 40%  13:5%
Sweden  0:6% 14%  4:3%
U.K.  2:6% 381%  3:2%
Table 3: Counterfactual AEi (CFAE in the table), the ratio of CFAE and AE (CFAE=AE), and
AE with country-specic i (AE with di i). Notes: Counterfactual AE measures the eect of
resource misallocation on aggregate TFP when the frictions of each country are the same as those
of the U.S., but the sectoral shares are not. AE with country-specic i is calculated using i
measured for each country for each year. These values are the averages over the years.
30
Figure 1: Measured capital wedge ~Ki for each country. Note: These values are the averages over
the years.
Figure 2: Measured labor wedge ~Li for each country. Note: These values are the averages over
the years.
31
Figure 3: Scatter graph of allocational eciency (AE) and aggregate TFP (ATFP) of the countries
compared with the U.S. for 1985, 1995, and 2005. Note: AE measures the eect of resource
misallocation on the dierence in aggregate TFP (ATFP) between other countries and the U.S.
Figure 4: Sectoral contribution of capital frictions, capital AEi. Notes: Capital AEi measures the
eect of sector i's capital frictions on aggregate TFP. These values are the averages over the years.
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Figure 5: Sectoral contribution of labor frictions, labor AEi. Notes: Labor AEi measures the eect
of sector i's labor frictions on aggregate TFP. These values are the averages over the years.
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